Chapter 1: International Standards more easily accepted by the general public. Utilizing these kinds of traditions could “offer benefits in the short and long terms, and could enhance efforts to reestablish the rule of law.”75 Cooperation between the formal judicial system and traditional dispute settlement actors could bring more credibility and legitimacy to the adjudicatory body; if the rules sound familiar and culturally acceptable, the public and the political parties will be more likely to understand them.76 One last element to take into consideration for codification purposes is the distinction between criminal and administrative (or non-criminal) claims.  It is crucial to establish the difference between these two types of claims.  Indeed, whether an electoral claim is administrative or criminal has important consequences on determining which authority has jurisdiction, the burden and standard of proof, and the sanctions and penalties.  For instance, if administrative claims regarding pre-poll and polling day are clearly defined by law, it could be possible for these claims to be handled by an administrative body with quasi-judicial authority.  Assuming that its staff is trustworthy, unbiased and not corrupted, this entity could act as a filter to dismiss the claims that are incomplete, frivolous and not supported by evidence.  It will enable the complaint adjudication body to deal only with the serious claims and in a timely manner.  Pakistan provides a good example for this discussion: the Pakistani system characterizes all electoral complaints (including pre-election violations) as criminal in nature, leading to numerous criminal proceedings even when dealing with small electoral irregularities during the campaign period or on polling day.77 It is crucial that legislative authorities understand what is meant by “complaints,” “adjudication,” and “resolution” outside the criminal law arena, such that overly harsh penalties through the criminal process do not make the system unworkable and unjust. Id. at 23. Id. In Afghanistan, the non-recognition and non-cooperation between the formal judiciary and the non-state practices led to defects in the enforcement of decisions. “Since the formal system does not, in effect, recognize customary practices, it is not in a position to oversee them. As a result, customary law seeks to shield disputes and their outcome from state authorities as a way to insulate their communities from state control or exploitation.” Id. 77 Farrah Naz, Improving Pakistan's Election Complaints System, IFES (May 13, 2009), http:// www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Opinions/2009/May/Improving-Pakistans-ElectionComplaints-System.aspx (discussing IFES-sponsored conference, Evolving Principles and Practices for Resolving Election Complaints: Pre-poll and Polling Day (Apr. 5-6, 2009)). 75 76 31