Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating, and Resolving Disputes in Elections This particular European Court decision also set up a two-part test for the question of impartiality. The Court first looked to the subjective “personal conviction and behavior of a particular judge in a given case.”109 The Court next reviewed the objective ascertainable facts that may have raised doubts as to impartiality of the adjudicator. This test is administered through an analysis of a range of elements: whether proceedings were impartial and independent; the appointment process for judges; and the influence over the lower courts by the court at issue. The test also evaluates the existence of “clear criteria and procedures for the promotion, disciplinary liability, appraisal and career development of judges; the limits to the discretionary powers vested in the presidents of the higher courts; and the financial and legislative guarantees for the functioning of the judicial bodies.”110 These elements provide a useful structure through which to analyze the impartiality of an adjudicating body. ii. Appointment and removal The process for appointing and removing a judge in charge of ruling on election complaints must also be determined by concerns for impartiality. A system of checks and balances should be in place to ensure impartiality of the decisions.111 If judges and arbiters are appointed by national entities such as the executive, a review process should be established to monitor the appointment process. The nomination of judges or arbiters by the head of state should require confirmation by or consultation with the legislature. However, if the same political party controls these two branches, then imposing a twothirds majority requirement could protect the interests of minorities in the recruitment or removal of electoral commissioners and judges.112 A system Id. ¶ 81. Id. ¶¶ 82-86. 111 Constitución Política de la República Oriental del Uruguay [Political Constitution of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay] Feb. 15, 1967, art. 324 (“Five incumbents and their alternates appointed by the General Assembly meeting both houses by two-thirds vote of its total components, must be citizens who, by their position in the political scene, are a guarantee of impartiality. The remaining four members, representatives of the Matches will be elected by the General Assembly by the system double simultaneous vote, accounting for two to the list Highest voted motto majority and two from the majority list of slogan next in number of votes.”). 112 Election Law No. 13, art. 19(a), (b) (2001) (Yemen) (codifying the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER), which is composed of 7 members appointed by a PresIdential Decree from a list of 15 names nominated by the House of Representatives, which must pass the list by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the House); see also IFES, Election Law Reform In Yemen: Supplementary Report 9 (2005), available at http://www. ifes.org/publication/3545312a460b9359a9b16a35f027be3f/FINALSupplRoLReport percent20English.pdf 109 110 40