Chapter 1: International Standards manent or temporary organs. The permanency of an adjudicatory body can ensure continuity in the work of the arbiters and staff and enable it to assess mistakes, challenges and successes following an election. It can also maintain and further the knowledge of arbiters in election law. However, such a permanent structure requires extensive financial support and in the time between elections there is no crucial need for sitting judges or arbiters. For example, in Mexico, electoral complaints are adjudicated by permanent Electoral Tribunals (one federal and several regional) that benefit from consistent government funding in order to perform its adjudicative task. This tribunal has also engaged in extracurricular activities such as promoting the Mexican electoral model abroad or providing technical assistance to developing democracies. The Uruguayan Electoral Court (Corte Electoral) is also a permanent complaint adjudication body.124 Although the Mexican model has proven very effective, in countries with fewer resources and different legal traditions, a temporary complaint adjudication body can be as efficient as a permanent one as long as its staff is nominated or appointed with sufficient time for preparation before the elections. The exercise of a double function by an arbiter will raise the same arguments that were laid out in the permanency and the remuneration discussion. While prohibiting a judge or arbiter to hold another position may provide a higher degree of impartiality, in newly developed democracies the state often does not have the resources to offer sufficient remuneration to enable the arbiters to hold only one position. To ensure the impartiality of arbiters, some countries instead provide for restrictions on their support to a political party. For example, the Uruguayan constitution does not permit members of the Electoral Court “to serve as political party officials or engage in political election propaganda.”125 Generally, the arbiters that adjudicate electoral complaints are either regular judges from the judiciary, or they work at the electoral commission and adjudication is one part of their job description. With that said, the Constitución Política de la República Oriental del Uruguay [Political Constitution of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay] Feb. 15, 1967, art. 322 (establishing autonomous and independent Electoral Corte “to decIde the final determination on all appeals and claims that arise, and judge of all praise elective office of the acts of plebiscite and referendum”). 125 Id. art. 77, § 5. 124 45