14 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE
Opinion of the Court
on other legislative aims. For example, we have denied attempts to reduce the amount of money in politics, see
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 191, to level electoral opportunities by equalizing candidate resources, see Bennett, 564
U. S., at 749–750, and to limit the general influence a contributor may have over an elected official, see Citizens
United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 359–360
(2010). However well intentioned such proposals may be,
the First Amendment—as this Court has repeatedly emphasized—prohibits such attempts to tamper with the
“right of citizens to choose who shall govern them.”
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 227; see also Davis, 554 U. S., at
742; Bennett, 564 U. S., at 750.
The Government argues that the contributions at issue
raise a heightened risk of corruption because of the use to
which they are put: repaying a candidate’s personal loans.
It also maintains that post-election contributions are particularly troubling because the contributor will know—not
merely hope—that the recipient, having prevailed, will be
in a position to do him some good.
We greet the assertion of an anticorruption interest here
with a measure of skepticism, for the loan-repayment limitation is yet another in a long line of “prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis approach[es]” to regulating campaign finance.
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 221 (quoting Federal Election
Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 479
(2007) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.)). Individual contributions to candidates for federal office, including those made
after the candidate has won the election, are already regulated in order to prevent corruption or its appearance. Such
contributions are capped at $2,900 per election, see 86 Fed.
Reg. 7869, and nontrivial contributions must be publicly
disclosed, see 52 U. S. C. §§30104(b)(3)(A), (c)(1). The dissent’s dire predictions about the impact of today’s decision
elide the fact that the contributions at issue remain subject