Previous 34 / 42 Next

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 KAGAN, J., dissenting democracy.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 388–389 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the appearance of that corruption (though scarcely mentioned in the majority opinion) is “[o]f almost equal concern.” Id., at 388. Avoiding that appearance is “critical” if public “confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” Id., at 389. Serious dangers of actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption attend the transactions Section 304 regulates— again, the use of post-election contributions to repay a candidate’s personal loans. Consider a simple comparison. When a campaign uses a donation to fund routine electoral activities (including speech), the money marginally aids the candidate’s electoral odds, but in no way adds to his personal wealth. By contrast, when a campaign uses a donation to repay the candidate’s loan, every dollar given goes straight into the candidate’s pocket. With each such contribution, his assets increase; he can now buy a car or make tuition payments or join a country club—all with his donors’ dollars. So contributions going to loan repayment have exceptional value to the candidate—which his donors of course realize. And when the contributions occur after the election, their corrupting potential further increases. At that time, a campaign can use donations only to repay loans, of which some 97% come from candidates. See 11 CFR 110.1(b)(3)(i) (2017); A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, SelfFunding of Political Campaigns, Management Science, Articles in Advance 5 (Apr. 7, 2022) (Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding). So post-election donors can be confident their money will enrich a candidate personally. And those donors have of course learned which candidate won. When they give money to repay the victor’s loan, they know—not merely hope—he will be in a position to perform official favors. The recipe for quid pro quo corruption is thus in place: a donation to enhance the candidate’s own wealth (the quid), made

Select target paragraph3

● ● ●

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether Section 304 of BCRA — which limits the amount of post-election contributions that a campaign may use to repay a candidate's personal loans to the campaign — violated the First Amendment by burdening core political speech. The specific question was whether the Government could demonstrate that the loan-repayment limitation was "closely drawn" to a sufficiently important interest — namely, preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance — given that the limitation deters candidates from loaning money to their campaigns by increasing the risk that such loans will not be fully repaid.

Alleged Acts: Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 amended FECA to limit the amount of post-election contributions that a campaign could use to repay a candidate's personal loans to his or her own campaign. Specifically, Section 304 capped at $250,000 the total amount of post-election contributions that could be used to repay candidate loans made before the election. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j). Any loan amount above $250,000 could not be repaid using post-election contributions. In 2018, Senator Ted Cruz loaned his Senate campaign committee ("Ted Cruz for Senate") $260,000 — $10,000 above the $250,000 repayment cap. After the election, the campaign received post-election contributions sufficient to repay the full loan. However, because of Section 304's $250,000 cap, the campaign could only repay $250,000 of the loan from post-election contributions, leaving $10,000 unreimbursed. Senator Cruz and his campaign committee sued the FEC, arguing that Section 304's loan-repayment limitation violated the First Amendment by burdening candidates' ability to loan money to their own campaigns.

Procedural history: The district court granted summary judgment for Senator Cruz, holding that Section 304's loan-repayment limit violated the First Amendment because it burdened political speech and the Government had failed to demonstrate that the limit served an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or was sufficiently tailored.

Summary: Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate is a significant campaign finance decision in which the Supreme Court struck down Section 304 of BCRA, which limited to $250,000 the amount of post-election contributions a campaign could use to repay a candidate's personal loans. The Court held that the provision violated the First Amendment because it burdened core political speech — by deterring candidates from loaning money to their own campaigns — without sufficient justification. Applying the "closely drawn" scrutiny standard, the Court found that the Government had failed to demonstrate that the loan-repayment limitation was "necessary" to prevent quid pro quo corruption, especially given that existing base contribution limits already constrained the amount any single donor could contribute to a campaign. The decision reinforced the Court's narrow definition of the permissible government interest in campaign finance regulation — limited to preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance — and the requirement that any speech-restrictive measure be "necessary," "narrowly tailored," and not "disproportionate." Cruz has been cited as a key precedent in subsequent campaign finance cases, including NRSC v. FEC (2026), which relied on Cruz's articulation of the rigorous "closely drawn" standard and its methodology of looking to the experience of the States to assess whether a particular campaign finance restriction is necessary.

Conclusion: In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and held that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First Amendment. The Court held that Section 304 burdens core political speech by restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans, thereby increasing the risk that such loans will not be repaid and deterring candidates from self-funding through loans in the first place. The Court applied the "closely drawn" scrutiny standard — the test used for contribution limits under Buckley and McCutcheon. Under this standard, a regulation must be "closely drawn" to a "sufficiently important interest" and may not be "disproportionate" or go beyond what is "necessary" to achieve the government's goal. The Court held that the Government had failed to demonstrate that Section 304's loan-repayment limitation furthers a permissible anti-corruption interest. The Government argued that the limitation prevents quid pro quo corruption by reducing the risk that a newly elected candidate would accept post-election contributions in exchange for official favors, with the contributions used to repay the candidate's personal loans. The Court found this rationale inadequate. The Court noted that existing contribution limits already prevented donors from giving more than the statutory maximum to the campaign, whether before or after the election. The loan-repayment limitation was therefore not "necessary" because the base contribution limits already served the anti-corruption interest, and the Government had not shown why an additional restriction on the source of repayment funds was needed.

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance

Applicable Law(s): Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Federal Election Campaign Act, and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: May 16, 2022

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf

Primary Documents

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE.pdf
English
Download View

Election Judgments - IFES

Select target paragraph3

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

Primary Documents

Notifications