INCAL JUDGMENT OF 9 JUNE 1998 25 terrorist threat persisted, military judges would have to continue to lend their full support to these special courts, whose task was extremely difficult. It is not for the Court – which is aware of the problems caused by terrorism (see, mutatis mutandis, the judgments cited in paragraph 58 above) – to pass judgment on these assertions. Its task is not to determine in abstracto whether it was necessary to set up such courts in a Contracting State or to review the relevant practice, but to ascertain whether the manner in which one of them functioned infringed the applicant’s right to a fair trial (see, among many other authorities, mutatis mutandis, the Fey v. Austria judgment of 24 February 1993, Series A no. 255-A, p. 12, § 27). 71. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the accused (see, among other authorities, the Hauschildt v. Denmark judgment of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 21, § 48, the Thorgeir Thorgeirson judgment cited above, p. 23, § 51, and the Pullar v. the United Kingdom judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, p. 794, § 38). In deciding whether there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular court lacks independence or impartiality, the standpoint of the accused is important without being decisive. What is decisive is whether his doubts can be held to be objectively justified (see, mutatis mutandis, the Hauschildt judgment cited above, p. 21, § 48, and the Gautrin and Others judgment cited above, pp. 1030–31, § 58). 72. Mr Incal was convicted of disseminating separatist propaganda capable of inciting the people to resist the government and commit criminal offences, for participating in the decision to distribute the leaflet in issue, taken on 1 July 1992 by the executive committee of the İzmir section of the HEP (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). As the acts which gave rise to the case were considered likely to endanger the founding principles of the Republic of Turkey, or to affect its security, they came ipso jure under the jurisdiction of the National Security Courts (see paragraph 28 above). The Court notes, however, that in considering the question of compliance with Article 10 it did not discern anything in the leaflet which might be regarded as incitement of part of the population to violence, hostility or hatred between citizens (see paragraph 50 above). Moreover, the National Security Court refused to apply the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) (see paragraph 16 above). In addition, the Court attaches great importance to the fact that a civilian had to appear before a court composed, even if only in part, of members of the armed forces. It follows that the applicant could legitimately fear that because one of the judges of the İzmir National Security Court was a military judge it might allow itself to be unduly influenced by considerations which had nothing to do with the nature of the case. The Court of Cassation was not able to dispel these concerns, as it did not have full jurisdiction (see paragraph 25 above