INCAL JUDGMENT 31 JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES THÓR VILHJÁLMSSON, GÖLCÜKLÜ, MATSCHER, FOIGHEL, Sir John FREELAND, LOPES ROCHA, WILDHABER AND GOTCHEV (Translation) Given the security situation in Turkey and the involvement of the armed forces in the process of countering terrorism, the Turkish authorities have considered it necessary to reinforce the National Security Courts, as specialised courts of criminal justice, by the inclusion of a military judge. We voted against the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 in respect of the applicant’s complaint that the National Security Court which tried him was not an “independent and impartial” tribunal on account of the fact that one of its members was a military judge, which allegedly caused the applicant to doubt its independence and impartiality. We do not accept that argument. In a number of cases the Court has acknowledged that a special court whose members include “experts” may be a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. The domestic legislation of the Council of Europe member States provides many examples of courts in which professional judges sit alongside specialists in a particular sphere whose knowledge is desirable and even necessary in deciding certain cases, provided that all the members of the court can offer the required guarantees of independence and impartiality. As to military judges who are members of the National Security Courts, paragraph 67 of the judgment describes the constitutional safeguards they enjoy, and paragraph 68 goes on to say that certain aspects of their status make it questionable. We consider the conclusions the Court drew from these aspects – the fact that military judges remain subject to military discipline and that assessment reports are compiled on them for that purpose, that decisions pertaining to their appointment are taken by the administrative authorities and the army and that their term of office as National Security Court judges is only four years – unconvincing. In that connection we would observe that it is possible for ordinary judges too to be subject to assessment and to disciplinary rules and for decisions pertaining to their appointment to be taken by the administrative authorities, and that the Court has held even a three-year term of office to be sufficient. In addition, at the end of their term of office as National Security Court judges, where that term is not renewed, the judges in question remain military judges for the whole duration of their careers.