In my judgment the provisions of section 33 (1) are mandatory and not directory. They are made in the public interest and are not intended to be personal to any individual elector. The requirement of secrecy is intended to be observed by all without reservation. Secrecy is a fundamental element of the electoral process, non-observance or denial of which must, at the very least, necessarily amount to an irregularity. Indeed, so seriously is the duty of secrecy taken that a breach of that duty by any person named in section 99 is by virtue of section 99 (4) made a criminal offence punishable on summary conviction by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, with or without hard labour Second, I am of the opinion that the events which occurred at polling divisions NOS. 23, 56, 57 and 58 clearly substantiate section 37 (d) of the Election Petitions Act and, in themselves, support ground 2 of this present application. Third, I agree with the submission of counsel for the applicant that on a proper construction of section 37 (e) of the Election Petitions Act the process of free and fair elections is substantially distorted or subverted when it is open to a tribunal to conclude that irregularities, either singly or collectively in the form of departures from the required procedure, have affected essential guarantees of fairness, impartiality, secrecy, regularity and public trust, whether such irregularities have also affected the result of an election, or not. So construed section 37 (e) reflects the English common law which prescribes that if an election was conducted so badly that it was not substantially in accordance with the law as to elections, the election is vitiated, irrespective of whether the result was affected, or not: see Morgan v Simpson ( 1 974) 3 All E.R.722 per Lord Denning M.R. at page 728. In my judgment, therefore, the decision of Smith C.J. in Keah Webster v Derrick