Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court candidates via large contributions to parties that are earmarked (i.e., directed) to a candidate? In Colorado II, this Court said that the limits were permissible. 533 U. S., at 462–465. Plaintiffs counter that there have been substantial changes since 2001 in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and in the other less-speech-restrictive tools available to the Government to prevent circumvention via earmarking, including earmarking and disclosure laws. And in light of those developments, plaintiffs say that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are now unconstitutional. To begin, Colorado II applied deferential scrutiny to Congress’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits as a means to prevent circumvention. The Court’s opinion made no mention of “narrow tailoring” and never suggested that the restriction must be considered “necessary” and not “disproportionate” for the anti-circumvention interest. On the contrary, the Court stated, for example, that Congress was “entitled to its choice” among alternatives and that the Court would not “throw out” the limits for “unskillful tailoring.” Id., at 463, n. 26, 465. Since Colorado II, the Court has sung a much different tune. The Court has emphasized that, even under the closely drawn test, judicial review must be “rigorous.” Restrictions on campaign finance cannot be “disproportionate” and must be “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to serve the Government’s asserted interest. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199 (law must avoid “unnecessary” abridgment of speech to survive “rigorous” review (quotation marks omitted)); id., at 218 (law must be “narrowly tailored” to meet the objective (quotation marks omitted)); id., at 220 (law cannot be “disproportionate to the Government’s interest”); Cruz, 596 U. S., at 306 (law must be “necessary for the interest it seeks to protect”). Under those more demanding standards, plaintiffs say that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are