Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 19 Opinion of the Court has evolved such that “disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public with information.” Id., at 224. Importantly, disclosure does not stand on its own. Rather, the combination of the base contribution limits plus the earmarking rules plus the disclosure requirements together serve the Government’s anti-circumvention interests here—without unduly restricting core political party speech. In response to amicus’s and intervenors’ arguments that the combination—namely, the base limits on contributions to candidates, the earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements—is still not adequate to prevent circumvention, the current record in the States does not demonstrate a sufficient risk of quid pro quo corruption from political-party coordinated expenditures. In the campaign finance context, this Court has often looked to the experience of the States. Id., at 209–210, n. 7; Cruz, 596 U. S., at 307. When States do not impose a particular campaign-finance restriction, the absence of evidence of resulting quid pro quo corruption is a strong sign that the concern is too speculative to support such a restriction at the federal level. On that issue, as Chief Judge Sutton recounted in the Sixth Circuit, a majority of the States “largely give parties free rein to make coordinated expenditures on behalf of their state-level nominees.” 117 F. 4th, at 396 (quotation marks omitted). Yet “no evidence of corruption” via circumvention “has materialized.” Ibid. That record in the States weakens any claim that federal political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are a proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored means for addressing circumvention. In a case involving attempted restrictions on speech, the absence of evidence matters. See Cruz, 596 U. S., at 307. Speculation does not suffice to justify suppression of political speech: The Court has “never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a