Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 23 Opinion of the Court of the Court); id., at 120–123 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). A prior decision may have been “egregiously wrong when decided” or “may be unmasked as egregiously wrong based on later legal or factual understandings or developments.” Id., at 122. Starting here with the asserted egregiousness of the error: In Colorado II, JUSTICE THOMAS dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. He explained that “the ordinary means for a party to provide support is to make coordinated expenditures.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 469 (2001). He added “that parties and candidates have shared interests, that it is natural for them to work together, and that breaking the connection between parties and their candidates inhibits the promotion of the party’s message.” Id., at 473. JUSTICE THOMAS further noted that the Court had “never upheld an expenditure limitation against political parties.” Id., at 475. And critically, he reasoned that there “are better tailored alternatives for addressing” the Government’s interests, including earmarking rules that prohibit contributions to parties that are earmarked to support particular candidates. Id., at 481. “Instead of broadly restricting political parties’ speech, the Government should have pursued better-tailored alternatives for combating the alleged corruption.” Id., at 482. JUSTICE THOMAS’s Colorado II dissent was persuasive in 2001 and has since been amply vindicated by this Court’s subsequent precedents. To briefly reiterate some of those post-2001 developments: The Court no longer employs Colorado II’s watered-down scrutiny that allowed “unskillful tailoring” in the First Amendment campaign-finance context. 533 U. S., at 463, n. 26. The Court now applies a stricter form of scrutiny: A statutory restriction may not be “disproportionate” and