3.
The right to vote "is protected in more than the initial allocation ofthe franchise, [but
alsol the manner of its exercise." Big Spring v. Jore, 2005 MT 64, fl 18, 326 Mont.
256, 261, 1 09 P.3d
4.
2I
9, 222 (quolir.g Bus h v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 1 04-05 (2000)).
As far back as 1895, the Montana Supreme Court held, "[s]tatutes tending to limit a
citizen in the exercise of the right to vote should be liberally construed in his favor."
Stackpole v. Hallahan (1895), 16 Mont.40, 85, 40 P. 80.
5.
In Montana, it is the "general rule" that strict scrutiny applies in voting rights
Johns on v. Kill ingsworth (1995), 27 1
6.
Mont.
1,
4, 894 P.2d 272,
cases.
27 4.
Voting rights cases involving "general" govemance issues are properly evaluated under
a strict scrutiny standard.
Id. a119.
7. "ln interpreting the Montana
Constitution, this Court has repeatedly refused to 'march
lock-step' with the United States Supreme Court, even where the state constitutional
provision at issue is nearly identical to its federal counterpart." State v. Guillaume,
1999
8.
MT 29,n16,293 Mont. 224,975P.2d312.
The State agrees that the Montana Supreme Court has "not specifically applied the
federal balancing test;' Driscoll v. Stapleton, Cause No. DA20-0295, State's Appeal
Br. at 10.
9.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided
I
nderson in 1983 and Burdick in 1992. Since then,
every voting rights case decided by the Montana Supreme Court under our own
Constitution has reaffirmed the general rule that strict scrutiny applies in voting rights
cases.
Killingsworth, 271 Mont. 1; Finke v. State ex rel. McGrath, 2003 MT 48, 314
Mont. 314, 65 P.3d576.
45