Wong Souk Yee v AG [2019] SGCA 25 provision. Constitutional provisions are designed to be more deeply entrenched and are generally regarded as fundamental in nature, and there may be a concern that applying such tools of statutory interpretation may not be consistent with the nature of constitutional provisions. This concern is exacerbated in the context of an updating construction because it rests on the assumption that the statutory provision in question is designed to be “always speaking”. It is on this basis that the court may interpret the provision in the light of changing circumstances (see Bennion at pp 409–410). However, in the context of a constitutional provision, we noted in Lim Meng Suang and another v AttorneyGeneral and another appeal and another matter [2015] 1 SLR 26 (“Lim Meng Suang”) at [92] that amending the Constitution to reflect changing social mores is more properly the remit of Parliament exercising the power of amendment granted to it under Art 5(2) of the Constitution. 65 Having made those observations, we do not think it is necessary in the present case to decide whether a rectifying or an updating construction may be applied to a constitutional provision, and if so, whether this is subject to any limits. This is because even if constitutional provisions and ordinary legislation were to be examined on the same footing, neither a rectifying nor an updating construction would be appropriate in the present case, as we will explain below. A rectifying construction is not appropriate in the present case 66 The test for when the adoption of a rectifying construction is permitted was most recently summarised in Nam Hong Construction & Engineering Pte Ltd v Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 604 at [55] as follows: 27