Wong Souk Yee v AG [2019] SGCA 25 requirements for judicial review. In Vellama at [33], we held that where an applicant asserts no more than a public right which is shared in common with other citizens, standing to pursue judicial review proceedings would accrue only if the applicant can demonstrate “special damage” to himself or herself. In Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 (“Jeyaretnam”) at [64], we clarified that in the “rare case” where a public duty which does not generate correlative private rights is breached and the breach is of sufficient gravity such that it would be in the public interest for the courts to hear the case, an applicant may have standing. The point to be made is that under the present standing framework in Singapore, if an applicant is not seeking to protect some private interest, it is unlikely that he or she would have standing. Yet, paradoxically, if the position in Vellama (HC) were accepted, such an applicant would be more likely to be able to avoid an adverse costs order should his or her application ultimately be unsuccessful. 93 At [48]–[50] of Jeyaretnam, we juxtaposed Singapore’s “green-light” approach towards administrative law with the UK’s “red-light” approach. Briefly, the approach in Singapore is principally not about stopping bad administrative practices, but about encouraging good ones, and hence, the implication is that good governance should be sought through the political process and public avenues rather than through combat in the courts. In contrast, the approach in the UK reflects what might perhaps be seen as a somewhat more adversarial relationship between the courts and the Executive. Thus, UK law incentivises and encourages administrative actions through lower standing requirements and by shielding applicants from adverse costs consequences, whereas Singapore takes the opposite approach. This distinction explains why the test imported in Vellama (HC) from the UK is at odds with the established Singapore law on standing. 38