7. Conclusions EMBs and courts of general jurisdiction are most frequently the bodies that hear electoral complaints in the first instance. In more than half of the countries with more than one level of adjudication, the highest levels of courts of general jurisdiction, such as supreme courts, high courts and courts of appeal, perform the role of the last-instance body. These findings indicate that, across the globe, electoral disputes are most often processed within the general court system. Constitutional courts or councils are the next most likely to perform the role of EDR body. When they hear complaints in the first instance, their decisions cannot be appealed in almost all circumstances. As the last-instance body, constitutional courts and councils deal with electoral disputes in less than 7 per cent of countries, but mostly hear appeals against the decisions of EMBs. Of the entities that are entitled to submit electoral complaints, the research found that candidates and political parties can submit elections-related complaints and challenges in the vast majority of countries. However, the research found a problem in the way voters—key stakeholders in elections—are entitled to submit electoral complaints. Legislation in only 47 per cent of countries allows voters to submit election results-related complaints; and complaints related to candidate/party registration or nomination in only 30 per cent of countries. These findings require additional enquiry into the causes and effects of such a wide pattern of legal exclusion of voters from raising electoral challenges. The research findings on EDR procedures point to some areas of concern, although these relate mainly to the extent to which legislation contains clear provisions. There is clear evidence that legal documents in many countries completely overlook or fail to prescribe clear rules on the specific procedural requirements or components of EDR mechanisms. These oversights and omissions could effectively create procedural barriers for both EDR bodies and complainants. EDR bodies could lose control over electoral dispute-resolution procedures and complainants might not have a clear idea about when and how complaints can be submitted or what to expect from EDR bodies. The worst outcome would be diminished public trust in electoral institutions. The research found that only 48 per cent of countries have oversight institutions with powers to impose administrative sanctions against infractions related to campaign finance. In 23 per cent of countries, campaign finance infractions are considered solely as criminal acts. The legislation of the remaining 29 per cent of countries does not provide for any oversight of campaign finance. It would be desirable to conduct further studies to understand why this aspect of elections remains unregulated in so many countries. Unclear legal provisions were also found in regulations covering EDR procedures for dealing with disputes related to campaign finance. The absence of clear provisions in 53