MAGYAR KÉTFARKÚ KUTYA PÁRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 17 (4) Constitutional complaints that have been admitted shall be submitted by the rapporteur for examination on the merits to the standing committee referred to in the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court, which shall adjudicate the case.” II. DOMESTIC PRACTICE A. Decision of the Constitutional Court no. 18/2008 (III.12.) AB 34. The case concerned the refusal of the National Election Commission to approve a question for referendum on the grounds that the petitioner had already presented, but subsequently withdrawn, the same referendum initiative. The Constitutional Court held, in so far as relevant, as follows: “... The election principles, including the obligation to exercise rights in accordance with their purpose, also flow from the State’s obligation to respect and protect fundamental rights (intézményvédelmi kötelezettség). As the Constitutional Court has explained, under Articles 2 and 70 of the Constitution the State has an obligation to secure the right to initiate and support referendums. This constitutional obligation is not conditional on necessity and proportionality, but on the realisation of the purpose of the right in question. ... Besides the obligation to respect and protect fundamental rights, the enforcement of the election principles also serves the interests of legal certainty, originating from the principle of the rule of law under Article 2 (1) of the Constitution. In its decision no. 32/2001 (VII.11) the Constitutional Court interpreted the election principles as guarantees for the rule of law ... ... The principle of the exercise of rights in accordance with their purpose has been developed by both the legal literature and the case-law relating to the prohibition of the abuse of rights in civil law. The requirement to exercise rights in accordance with their purpose is derived from the civil-law regulations incorporating the statutory prohibition of abuse of rights, and permeates the entire legal system. It means that entitled persons may avail themselves of legal institutions only in a manner which is in compliance with the purpose and content of those institutions. Only when exercised in that way do rights enjoy statutory protection and recognition corresponding to the true content – and not only the formal conditions – of the entitlement. Article 2(2) of Act no. IV of 1959 on the Civil Code provides that ‘the law shall ensure that everybody can exercise his or her right in compliance with the societal purpose of the right’. ... On the basis of the legislative provisions cited above and the examples provided therein, it can be established that the legislature does not define the criteria for determining what constitutes an exercise of rights not in accordance with their purpose or an abuse of rights, but leaves it to the application of the law to decide whether in the given circumstances the person has exercised his or her rights in accordance with their purpose. The examples which are provided of an exercise of rights not in accordance with their purpose and of an abuse of rights imply that the exercise of a right not in accordance with its purpose can be established if it entails negative consequences (for instance, the restriction or infringement of the rights of others).