OCTOBER TERM, 1975 Per Curiam 424 U. S. the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process, it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression. For the First Amendment right to "'speak one's mind . . . on all public institutions' " includes the right to engage in "'vigorous advocacy' no less than 'abstract discussion.'" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 269, quoting Bridges v. California,314 U. S. 252, 270 (1941), and NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 429. Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation. 4 It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates imposed by § 608 (e) (1)'s ex- penditure ceiling. But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in 51 Appellees mistakenly rely on this Court's decision in CSC v. Letter Carriers,as supporting § 608(e) (1)'s restriction on the spending of money to advocate the election or defeat of a particular candidate. In upholding the Hatch Act's broad restrictions on the associational freedoms of federal employees, the Court repeatedly emphasized the statutory provision and corresponding regulation permitting an employee to " '[e]xpress his opinion as an individual privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates.' " 413 U. S., at 579, quoting 5 CFR § 733.111 (a) (2). See 413 U. S., at 561, 568, 575-576. Although the Court "unhesitatingly" found that a statute prohibiting federal employees from engaging in a wide variety of "partisan political conduct" would "unquestionably be valid," it carefully declined to endorse provisions threatening political expression. See id., at 556, 579-581. The Court did not rule on the eonrstitutional questions presented by the regulations forbidding partisan campaign endorsements through the media and speechmaking to political gatherings because it found that these restrictions did not "make the statute substantially overbroad and so invalid on its face." Id., at 581.