BUCKLEY v. VALEO Per Curiam 1 who seek federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office. Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity."8 This exposure may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either before or after the election. A public armed with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in return." And, as we recognized in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S., at 548, Congress could reasonably conclude that full disclosure during an election campaign tends "to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections." In enacting these requirements it may have been mindful of Mr. Justice Brandeis' advice: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." "' Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, report7 8 Ibid.; S. Rep. No. 93-689, p. 2 (1974). 79 We have said elsewhere that "informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936). Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 625 (1954) (upholding disclosure requirements imposed on lobbyists by the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, Title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 839). so L. Brandeis, Other People's Money 62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933).