20 Official Gazette, Issue 24 App (a) on 14 June 2012 violation by the legislative authority of the power of the judicial authority, and an undue assumption of those powers from the legislation, in violation of the text of Articles (19 and 46) of the aforementioned Constitutional Declaration. Article (1) of the aforementioned Constitutional Declaration (which promulgated the law containing the referred text as part of the implementation of its provisions) stipulated that, “The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic state based on citizenship…” Articles (26 to 28) of the declaration stipulate the conditions which must be met by those elected as President of the Republic. Articles (32 to 41) of the declaration set out the rules relating to the election of members of the People’s Assembly and the Advisory Council. The stipulations of these articles collectively show that the Constitutional Declaration, as with all Egyptian constitutions, insists upon upholding the political rights of all citizens, who shall properly be entitled to be nominated and elected, in addition to being consulted and asked to offer an opinion. It enables them to practice these rights, thus ensuring their participation in public life, as a democratic way of expressing opinions, selecting a leader and representatives to manage the affairs of state, and forming parliaments charged with serving the common good. The term “citizenship” used by the constitutional document as the basis of the democratic system in the state opens the way for practicing political rights. It allows for all citizens to wield and protect popular sovereignty, as stated and emphasized by Article (3) of the aforementioned Constitutional Declaration which says, “Only the people have sovereignty and are the source of all powers, the people exercise and protect this sovereignty…” The concept of citizens exercising their political rights, particularly the right to be nominated and elected, is one of the most important features and applications of the practicing of popular sovereignty, whether they do so as voters enjoying the right to select candidates in light of a conviction of the candidates’ abilities to express the issues with which they are concerned, or as candidates competing, within an equitable framework, to win seats. These two rights are linked and complementary, and mutually affect each other. Accordingly the legislation’s exercise of its discretionary authority to regulate these rights is dependent upon it abiding by the limits and controls stipulated for in the constitutional document, offering its guarantee, and ensuring the right of each citizen to practice these powers in accordance with a subjective framework which does not affect the essence thereof, detract from them, affect their continuance, or damage, squander or confiscate them as a constitutional obligation on the part of the legislator which cannot be avoided, or else the legislator will violate the constitution he himself is implementing. Given the above, the stipulation of the referred text to suspend the exercise of political rights during the specified period for each individual who has held the specified posts, represents in truth a deprivation of the practice of these rights and of participation in public life throughout the specified period, without an expediency or justification accepted by the provisions of the Constitutional Declaration. It involves the destruction of the principle of these rights and represents an attack thereon, a confiscation thereof, and a restriction on the exercising thereof, in excess of the limits of the circle of regulation of the rights possessed by the legislation, an issue which is made apparent by the text and the contents of the provisions, in contradiction of the