8 Official Gazette, Issue 24 App (a) on 14 June 2012 independents not belonging to any party; Article 9 bis A of this law, which was supplemented by Decree-law No. 120/2011, in that it stipulates that the final list of the names of candidates under the individual candidacy system specify the political party to which the candidate belongs. The interest here is because ruling on the constitutionality of these provisions would have an effect and impact on the merits case, the motions filed therein, and the court hearing the case. The scope of this case and the interest therein also extends to the text of Article 1 of the aforementioned Decree-law No. 123/2011, which is connected to the aforementioned provisions such that it may not be split or detached, which places it before this Court for judgment. Whereas the referral judgment blamed the appealed provisions for their violation of the right to run for office, and the principle of equality and parity established by Article 7 of the Constitutional Declaration, since it allowed political party members to compete with independents not belonging to such parties over the one-third allotted for the individual candidacy system, despite their monopoly over the two-thirds allotted for election under the closed party-list system. Whereas Article 1 of the Constitutional Declaration issued on the Thirtieth of March 2011 stipulates that: "The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic state based on the principle of citizenship," and Articles 32 to 41 of this Declaration specify the rules related to electing the People's Assembly and Shura Council. The significance and bases of that ruling are that the constitutional legislature is keen on guaranteeing the political rights of all citizens, the foundation of which are the right to candidacy, suffrage, and participation in referendums, and on enabling them to practice those rights in order to guarantee their participation in public life, considering them one of the democratic means of expressing opinions and choosing leaders and representatives steering the governing of the country and forming parliament. Hence, the practicing of citizens of their political rights, particularly the right to candidacy and suffrage, are considered one of the most important features and implementation, whether as voters who enjoy the right to elect their candidates in light of their satisfaction of their ability to express issues of importance to them, or as candidates striving, according to fair rules, to win the seats they are competing to occupy. Hence it was the practice of the legislatures of their discretional authority to regulate those two rights, subject to abiding by the limits and measures provided by the Constitutional Declaration, in a way that does not allow the organization of the election process, whether its time, location, or way it is conducted, to be used as a pretext to violate the rights which the Constitutional Declaration provided for the process, in a way that would thwart its essence, discredit it, influence its presence, make it futile or seize it. Whereas it is established in the administration of justice in this court that the principle of equality before the law - provided by Article 7 of the aforementioned Constitutional Declaration - is neither a dictating, static principle denying practical need, nor a hard rule that discards all forms of discrimination, nor is it a guarantee of the accuracy of measurement warranted by the absolute scale of justice between matters. If it was permissible for the State to itself undertake measures it deems appropriate to regulate a certain issue, or to avert an evil which it deems necessary to repel, and it was necessary that a major damage be warded off by a minor damage, its implementation of the principle of equality shall not reveal its whims, nor be