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See Mukasa Anthony Harris V. Dr. Bayiga Michael Phillip Lulume, (Supra) S.C.C.A No. 18
of 2007and Matsiko Winfred Komuhangi V. Babihuga J. Winnie, Election Petition Appeal
No. 9 of 2002.
In Blyth V. Blyth [1966] AC 643, Lord Denning observed as to the import and meaning of the
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word ‘’satisfied’’, he said
‘’ …the courts must not strengthen it, nor must they weaken it. Nor
would I think it desirable that any kind of gloss should be put upon
it. When parliament has ordained that a court must be satisfied,
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only parliament can prescribe a lesser requirement. No one whether
he be a judge or juror would in fact be ‘’satisfied’��� if he was in a
state of reasonable doubt…’’.
Odoki C.J in Col. (Rtd) Dr. Besigye Kiiza V. Museveni Yoweri Kaguta & Electoral
20
Commission, Election Petition No. 1 of 2006, agreed and applied the above observations of Lord
Denning. He stated;
‘’…it is true that court may not be satisfied if it entertains a
reasonable doubt, but the decision will depend on the gravity of the
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matter to be proved…’’
In a recent decision of Paul Mwiru v. Hon. Igeme Nabeta & Others-Election Petition Appeal
No. 06 of 2011 this court said:
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“Section 61(3) of the PEA sets the standard of proof in
parliamentary election petitions. The burden of proof lies on the
petitioner to prove the allegations in the petition and the standard
of proof required is proof on a balance of probabilities. The
provision of this subsection was settled by the Supreme Court in
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the case of Mukasa Harris v Dr Lulume Bayiga (supra) when it
upheld the interpretation given to the subsection by this court
and the High Court.”
8