would not be able to do so, even though they acted reasonably in pursuit of that
right. He referred in support to a statement parallel to this in New National Party
of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa.52 In my view,
the interpretation which Mr. Mendes suggested herein would bring an unnecessary
complexity and distortion to the meaning of Rule 1(7).
Submissions on behalf of the respondents
[87]
Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that, for at least 2 obvious
reasons, the reference to Rule 26(1) is unnecessary as an aid to finding that Rule
1(7) is not mandatory. One reason is that the notice by the returning officer under
Rule 26(1) is intended for the public, who are not usually familiar with the rules.
The second is that the notice under Rule 26(1) is intended to ensure that Rule 1(7)
is observed. I agree.
Decision
[88]
In my view, the judge’s decision that Rule 1(7) must be construed strictly, was
correct for the reasons which she gave. It seems obvious to me that the
interpretation, which learned counsel for the appellants suggest and engender
procrastination, laxity, uncertainty and confusion in the electoral process. It could
lend comfort to electoral officials to open polling stations at any time during
election day, regardless of any notice that is given pursuant to Rule 26(1) of the
Election Rules. Electors may wait and leave in frustration after lengthy periods.
Electors who are employed are likely to go to the polls early. In any event, section
34 of the Representation of the People Act allows them to be away from work
for 4 consecutive hours to vote. The interpretation which learned counsel for the
appellants suggest makes it quite possible that an employed elector, for example,
may not be able to vote within the time specified because of the tardy opening of
52
(1995) 5 BCLR 489, at paragraph 23 of the judgment.
39
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