[160] The learned trial judge declared the election of the appellants void on the ground that it was only possible to deduce from the evidence that an indeterminate number of persons were prevented from voting during the hours of voting time that were lost. The judge concluded that the effect of the breach caused by the late opening of the polls on the results in the contested constituencies was not known. Given this and the number of persons who did not vote in each of these constituencies, as well as the margins of victory, it was difficult to say definitely that the results were affected or were not affected by the late start in voting. In those circumstances the applicable test which the judge used was that which was applied in Edgell v Glover, and later approved in Considine v Didrichsen. According to the judge, that test dictates that where the court cannot say that the result was not affected by a breach, the court must void the election. The judge’s reasoning [161] It would be helpful to set out the reasoning of the trial judge in some detail. She stated them thus in the Jonas/Quinn-Leandro case:105 “[241] The Court has once again given due consideration to all of the relevant and admissible evidence that was led in this matter, together with the very comprehensive submissions of all Learned … Counsel. It bears noting that all … Counsel referred to the statistics provided and made several assumptions in urging the Court to find one way or the other that the results were not affected, or could have been affected. With respect, the Court has viewed the mathematical tests that were relied upon and found them very unhelpful. The Court is not persuaded that a proper approach is to assume that persons did not come out to vote in the numbers in 2009 as they did in 2004, due to the length of time that the previous Government was in office, as voiced by Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, as being responsible for the difference in the margin of victory. Equally, the Court is not persuaded that it can be determined precisely how many persons were unable to vote as a result of the late opening of the polls. The Court will not speculate. However, where the Court has found concrete facts, it is entitled to draw inferences from those facts. The preponderance of evidence does not indicate that only the persons who testified were unable to vote. It clearly indicates that others 105 At paragraphs 241-245 of the judgment. 70

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