ELECTION WATCHDOGS 5/30/17 11:29 AM Candidate accreditation was also a serious issue in Afghanistan. To ensure transparency, the IEC initially set no limit on how many candidate agents could be accredited or present at the audit site at one time, but the flood of agents from both candidates engendered a frenzied rumor mill that escalated minor doubts to serious accusations of fraud or misconduct. Security concerns after a few violent confrontations led the IEC and its advisers to reduce the number of agents permitted at the audit site. A final note is in order on the characterization of the 2014 transfer of power in Afghanistan: as the audit unfolded, some stakeholders complained that the process was subject to the whim of the candidates. Allegations of fraud by both sides brought the electoral process and audit to a standstill. Pressure to find a solution – even one that might be outside the legal framework for the elections – was increased by concerns that failing to find a mutually acceptable solution would lead to serious instability. The IEC ultimately agreed not to release the final results of the audit as part of the negotiations that led to the National Unity Government that leads Afghanistan today. Only one of the six principles described above – external monitoring by professional observers – can be said to have been met during the Afghanistan audit in 2014 (albeit with significant challenges to their work). The other five standards were largely not met: although legal mandate for the audit remained with the IEC, the July 12 agreement gave a large role in the audit process directly to international entities; standards and procedures for dealing with sensitive issues such as similarly marked ballots and results sheets were neither established in advance nor understood by all stakeholders; the audit process was marred by insufficient training and inconsistent application of procedures (especially as clarifications were made but not applied retroactively); limited review of multiple evidence types and challenges with maintaining a clear chain of custody of evidence beset the process; and, the right of appeal to the IECC, available under the law, was stymied by the lack of appeal procedures and the decision not to release the final results of the audit. Haiti (2010) Prior to the November 2010 presidential election in Haiti, the country suffered a devastating earthquake (European Commission on Humanitarian Aid 2016). Haiti’s infrastructure was considered “among the world’s worst even in the best of times” (CNN 2010) and critical components of the electoral process, including voter lists, ID cards, and polling stations were lost or destroyed in the earthquake and needed to be re-created in an extremely short time amidst extreme devastation (Tracy 2010). A cholera outbreak in October traced to UN peacekeeping troops from Nepal (Frerichs et al. 2012) cast further doubt on the efficacy and motives of foreign assistance agencies in Haiti (Boumba 2015; Sherwell 2010). Against this backdrop, the head of the Organization of American States (OAS) 14