William challenges the court’s decision regarding his voting capacity, arguing that, even though “[t]he Circuit Court correctly focused upon how the issue at trial was the [Act] and its place as a less restrictive alternative to guardianship[,]” it “erred by assessing [his] capacity to vote in forced isolation, without evaluating how the Parents could support him.” In William’s view, the Act ��does not require judicial ‘appointment’ of a supported decision-maker[,]” but its ruling on his voting rights must be overturned for two reasons. First, he argues that the court “applied the wrong legal standard[s]” when it “added a[n] ‘understand the voting process’ test to enfranchisement not found in the Election Law, which only requires effective communication of a ‘desire to participate in the voting process.’” Second, the court again erred “in a way directly connected to the [Act],” William continues, when it prohibited him and his Parents “from using (or demonstrating) the use of supported-decision-makers as an accommodation.” Consequently, William contends that the circuit court’s determination that he could not understand the voting process sufficiently to communicate his desire to participate “even with the help and guidance of supported decision-makers” is clearly erroneous because the court “affirmatively barred the Parents from engaging in, or in any way demonstrating their role, as an accommodation.” As the excerpted transcript shows, the circuit court and counsel recognized there is no precedent explaining how William’s request to vote intersects with his right to receive decision-making support from his Parents. After expressing understandable uncertainty affecting both the applicable procedures and legal standards, the circuit court denied both William’s right to vote and the joint requests for approval of Parents as supported decision24