32 ŽDANOKA v. LATVIA JUDGMENT they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). In particular, any such conditions must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see Hirst, cited above, § 62). 105. In relation to the cases concerning the right to vote, that is, the socalled “active” aspect of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has considered that exclusion of any groups or categories of the general population must be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, § 28, ECHR 2004-V). In particular, the Court has found that domestic legislation imposing a minimum age or residence requirements for the exercise of the right to vote is, in principle, compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Hilbe v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 31981/96, ECHR 1999-VI; see also Hirst, cited above, § 62). The Convention institutions have also held that it was open to the legislature to remove political rights from persons convicted of serious or financial crimes (see Holland v. Ireland, no. 24827/94, Commission decision of 14 April 1998, DR 93-A, p. 15, and M.D.U. v. Italy (dec.), no. 58540/00, 28 January 2003). In Hirst (§ 82), however, the Grand Chamber underlined that the Contracting States did not have carte blanche to disqualify all detained convicts from the right to vote without having due regard to relevant matters such as the length of the prisoner’s sentence or the nature and gravity of the offence. A general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on all detained convicts’ right to vote was considered by the Court as falling outside the acceptable margin of appreciation. 106. The Convention institutions have had fewer occasions to deal with an alleged violation of an individual’s right to stand as a candidate for election, that is, the so-called “passive” aspect of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. In this regard the Court has emphasised that the Contracting States enjoy considerable latitude in establishing constitutional rules on the status of members of parliament, including criteria governing eligibility to stand for election. Although they have a common origin in the need to ensure both the independence of elected representatives and the freedom of choice of electors, these criteria vary in accordance with the historical and political factors specific to each State. The multiplicity of situations provided for in the constitutions and electoral legislation of numerous member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of possible approaches in this area. Therefore, for the purposes of applying Article 3, any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, § 54, and Podkolzina, § 33, both cited above).