ŽDANOKA v. LATVIA JUDGMENT – DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ZUPANĆIĆ In different terms the same issue arose in Slivenko (cited above). The critical distinction when an individual’s human right is at stake is precisely between an individual’s personal situation on the one hand, and the larger historical and collective situation of the group to which he or she happens to belong on the other1. In principle, human rights are strictly individual rights. Historical and collective aspects of the situation are beyond the scope of our jurisdiction. Yet the majority opinion, like the domestic decisions concerning Mrs Ždanoka, rightly treats her situation as representative not merely of her private predicament. Obviously, the right to stand for election – for this reason considered in a separate Protocol – affects the individual (Mrs Ždanoka) and the collectivity (the Russian-speaking minority) he or she has the ambition to represent politically. The majority opinion, however, implicitly amalgamates the two aspects. The consequence of this mingling of issues is explicit endorsement of the denial of the right to stand for election. The reason for this denial was that Mrs Ždanoka had a real chance of being elected2. So much for democracy. Admittedly, this result is a consequence of the narrow scope of our jurisdiction. Yet, are we here to correct the historical wrongs? Are we to say that 30% of the Latvian population is there illegally? Even if these people were regarded as aliens, their collective expulsion would be explicitly be so unusual. This is made clear by the example of Slovene-populated territories now in Italy and Austria. In both countries the Slovenian population was subject to intense FascistNazi colonisation and fierce assimilation as evidenced even today by the efforts of Mr Haider. The result is ethnic intolerance. Such intolerance broke out – likewise for demographic reasons – in the war between Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo. Such intolerance is the precursor of ethnic cleansing. The historic situation in Broniowski v. Poland ([GC], no. 31443/96, ECHR 2004-V), for example, was the consequence of such an attempt amounting to the across-the-board displacement of the population resident in the so-called “territories beyond the Bug River”. 1. “[P]luralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a ‘democratic society’ (p. 23, § 49). Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position. Accordingly, the mere fact that the applicants’ standpoint was adopted by very few of their colleagues is again not conclusive of the issue now before the Court.” Such was the position of the old Court in Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, § 63, Series A no. 44. The problem in the case at hand is precisely the reverse: Mrs Ždanoka’s views would have been embraced by too many for this to be “politically safe”. 2. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. res. 47/135, annex, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 210, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1993). Article 3, para 1: “Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights, including those set forth in the present Declaration, individually as well as in community with other members of their group, without any discrimination.”