Kaguta and Mbayo Jacob v Electoral Commission &another (supra) to find that the evidence on both sides in its entirety was quite subjective and cannot be relied upon without testing its authenticity from a neutral and independence source. The two decisions mentioned above did not lay down any hard and fast rule that in election matters there must be corroboration before the evidence can be accepted as being truthful. Section 133 of the Evidence Act states that “subject to the provisions of any other law, in force, no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be 10 required for the proof of any fact.” It was therefore important for the learned judge to state why the evidence of a witness is preferred against another or which particular evidence needed corroboration. She needed to state which particular witnesses were untruthful or unreliable. I shall quote an extract from the judgment to illustrate the point. At page 403 line 29 she said: 20 “In the present case Iam faced with 2 contradictory sets of evidence: allegations by the petitioner and rebuttals by the 1st respondent. I therefore revert to documentary evidence to confirm the truthfulness of either case. Iam fortified in this approach by Sarkar’s Law of Evidence, 1993 14th Edition at p.924 which states as follows: “In contradictions of oral testimony which occurs in almost every case, the documentary evidence must be looked to in order to see on which side the truth lies.” I did not find any evidence that conclusively proves that the 1st respondent personally committed the acts of bribery complained of. On the contrary the documentary evidence adduced by the 1st respondent suggested otherwise. He attached a campaign program as proof that he did not go to the Napier market on the day he is alleged to have offered a bribe to the market vendors as he 26