application of the measure rather than a more positive assertion. That is because of the prefatory phrase, “applies only to”. That said, the fact there is an express recognition that the Bill of Rights applies to the legislative branch is of importance in the overall scheme.54 [44] Next, s 4 makes it plain a court cannot hold a provision “to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or (b) decline to apply any provision … by reason only that the provision is inconsistent” with the Bill of Rights. That section means the courts cannot, for example, refuse to apply the voter disqualification only because of inconsistency with the Bill of Rights. It says nothing about the present issue. As Professor Brookfield suggested, in his important discussion of the availability of a declaration of inconsistency, the:55 … very precise wording of s 4 leaves it open – and indeed the Bill as a whole arguably requires – that a Court should, at least in a case of serious infringement … formally declare that inconsistency ... . [45] The argument was made by the Solicitor-General that Parliament does not breach individual rights when it enacts inconsistent legislation because Parliament has, in this way, changed the content of those rights. 56 Counsel also drew in aid s 92J of the Human Rights Act. That section provides that where the Human Rights Review Tribunal finds an enactment is “in breach” of Part 1A the only declaration the Tribunal can make is that the enactment is “inconsistent” with the right to freedom from discrimination.57 [46] It is clear that the scheme of the Bill of Rights preserves Parliament’s ability to legislate inconsistently with rights. But a formal declaration to the same effect is not in conflict with that. Rather, in this sense, the Bill of Rights remains as the standard or palimpsest albeit Parliament has exercised its power to legislate inconsistently with 54 55 56 57 Contrast Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 6(3) (acts of public authorities exclude Parliament). F M Brookfield “Constitutional Law” [1992] NZ Recent Law Review 231 at 239. See also Andrew S Butler “Judicial Indications of Inconsistency – A New Weapon in the Bill of Rights Armoury?” [2000] NZ L Rev 43; and Paul Rishworth “Reflections on the Bill of Rights after Quilter v Attorney-General” [1998] NZ L Rev 683. Hence the submission was made that it is inapt to refer to the vindication of rights because the legislature has acted lawfully in enacting the measure. Section 92K(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1993 makes it clear that a declaration under s 92J does not affect the validity of the enactment to which the declaration relates. See also New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 70E(6) and (7).