Certainty is an essential desideratum in law and any amendment of law to achieve that object is manifestly a permissible piece of legislation. The choice of date was a matter for the legislature to decide and the court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the legislature in this respect, more so, when whatever be the choice of date, has aspects of both pros and cons. The date of nomination is normally, as in the present case, about a month before the date of polling and it is plain that most of the acts of corrupt practice are committed during this period. In any case, as mentioned above, the court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the legislature in the choice of date. The choice of date, as observed in the case of Union of India v. M/s. Parameshwaran Match Works, (AIR 1974 SC 2349) as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of finding it precisely the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. 236. One of the objects of the change effected by Act 40 of 1975 is to remove the uncertainty and set at rest the controversy as to what would be the precise date of a person in the service of the Central Government ceasing to be in such service in case he tenders his resignation. The amended law makes it clear that where the date of taking effect of the resignation is stated in the publication in the Official Gazette, it shall be that date. Similarly, in the case of appointment of a person, the date of taking effect of such appointment shall be the date mentioned in the publication in the Official Gazette in case such a date is stated in such publication. The fact that the new provision creates a conclusive presumption with regard to the date of taking effect of appointment or resignation does not mean, as is sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent, that there has been an encroachment by the legislature upon the judicial sphere. Laying down a rule of conclusive presumption in a statute with a view to remove uncertainty with regard to the date of the taking effect of appointment or resignation of a Government employee cannot be characterised as an assumption of judicial power by the legislature. Another object of the change effected by Act 40 of 1975 is that a candidate who is bound, in view of para 8 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 to use the party symbol allotted by the Election Commission and who cannot use any other symbol, shall not suffer and be guilty of corrupt practice under Section 123 (3) of the RP Act because of the use of that symbol. It is to be assumed that Election Commission which is an independent body, would act fairly and properly and would not allot a symbol, which is a religious symbol, to a party or a candidate. The fact that the allotted symbol was one of those suggested by the party concerned would not relieve the Election Commission of its duty to see that it does not allot a religious symbol to that party. Assuming that the Election Commission makes an error of judgment in this respect and allots a symbol which, in fact, is a religious symbol, the object of the new provision is