and telephone charges, on the meetings addressed by Sri Yashpal Kapur within the Constituency during the period of election, on the election material viz. Pamphlets, posters, etc. and on the lighting arrangements made for some meetings addressed by the respondent No. 1. According to learned counsel, these expenses are also liable to be added to the election expenses of the respondent No. 1. None of these expenses were, however, pleaded in the petition. In fact, till the commencement of the arguments in the case, the respondent No. 1 could not even anticipate that the petitioner shall rely on these expenses for the purpose of his case. It will, therefore, be prejudicial to the interest of respondent No. 1 if the aforesaid expenses are taken into consideration. The submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner is accordingly negatived.’’ I am in full agreement with the above observations of the High Court and find no cogent ground to take a different view. 248. It may be stated that in view of the new explanation added to Section 77 of the RP Act by Act 40 of 1975, the amount of Rs. 12,000 which represented 75 per cent of the expenditure incurred on the construction of 10 rostrums borne by the Government, cannot be included in the total election expenses of the appellant. The High Court was also inclined to hold that the said amount of Rs. 12,000 could not be included in the appellant’s expenses. The High Court however, included the total amount of Rs. 16,000 in the election expenses of the appellant upon the assumption that the appellant had not disavowed that expenditure. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the High Court has found on issue No. 9 that the total expenses incurred by the appellant on her election have not been shown to exceed the prescribed limit. I find no cogent reason to interfere with that finding. 249. I also agree with the High Court that as the election expenses of the appellant have not been shown to exceed the prescribed limit of Rs. 35,000, the question of invoking and going into the validity of Act 58 of 1974 does not arise. Nor is it necessary to express an opinion about the view taken in Kanwarlal v. Amarnath Chawla. AIR 1975 SC 308 in view of the fact that even after applying the rule laid down in that case, the total election expense of the appellant has not been shown to exceed the prescribed limit. 250. So far as the finding of the High Court on issue No. 6 regarding the use of the symbol of cow and calf is concerned, the matter, as already discussed earlier, is now covered by the amendment made in Section 123 (3) of the RP Act by Section 8 of Act 40 of 1975. 251. There was a controversy during the course of arguments on the point as to whether I have laid down in my judgment in Kesavananda Bharati's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra) that fundamental rights are not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. As this controversy cropped up a number of times, it seems apposite that before I conclude I should deal with the contention advanced by learned Solicitor General that according by learned Solicitor General that according to my judgment in that case no fundamental right is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. I find it difficult to read anything in that judgment to justify such a conclusion. What has been laid down in that judgment is that no article of the Constitution is immune from the amendatory process because of the fact that it relates to a