so notorious a perversion of justice, the House consented to submit the exercise of its privilege to a tribunal constituted by law, which, though composed of its own members should be appointed so as to secure impartiality and the administration of justice according to the laws of the land under the sanction of oaths”. The principle of the Grenville Act, and of others which were passed at different times since 1770, was the selection by lot of committees for the trial of election petitions. And at present, by Part III of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, the trial of controverted elections is confided to Judges selected from the judiciary in the appropriate part of the United Kingdom. Provision is made in each case for constituting a rota from whom these Judges are selected. The House has no cognizance of these proceedings until their determination, when the Judges certify their determination. The Judges are to make a report in any case where a charge has been made in the petition of corrupt and illegal practice having been committed at an election; and they may also make a special report on any matter arising which they think should be submitted to the House.* 272. Article 1, Section 5 (1) of the Constitution of the United States of America provides that each House shall be the Judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. 273. In whichever body or authority, the jurisdiction is vested, the exercise of the jurisdiction must be judicial in character. This Court has held that in adjudicating an election dispute an authority is performing a judicial function and a petition for leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution would lie to this Court against the decision notwithstanding the provisions of Article 329 (b) (see Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Rathuraj Singh (1955) 1 SCR 267 = (AIR 1954 SC 520)). 274. In Barry v. United States Ex. Rel. Cunningham, (1928) 73 Law Ed 867, it was held that in exercising the power to judge of the election returns and qualifications of members, the senate acts as a judicial tribunal. 275. It might be that if the adjudication of election disputes in respect of its members had been vested in each of the Houses of Parliament by the Constitution, the decision of the House would have been final. That would have been on the basis of the doctrine of the political question, namely, that the function has been exclusively committed textually to another agency. I am aware that the doctrine of political question has no hospitable quarter in this Court since the decision in Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 530. But I venture to think that the doctrine alone can explain why the courts abstain from interfering with a verdict on an impeachment of the President for violation of the Constitution, a function essentially judicial.* 276. An election dispute has a public aspect in that it is concerned more with the right of a constituency to be represented by a particular candidate. But it does not follow from the public character of the controversy that there is no lis between the parties to the election contest and that the lis can be resolved otherwise than by ascertaining the facts relating to the election, and applying the relevant law.'