the fundamental rights or right taken away or abrogated constitute or constitutes a basic structure. 361. Counsel for the respondent then contended that retrospective operation has been given to the provisions of these Acts and that that would destroy or damage an essential feature of democracy viz., free and fair elections. The argument was that if one set of laws existed when an election was held and the result announced, you cannot thereafter substitute another set of laws and say that those laws must be deemed to have been in operation at the time when the election was held and the result announced, as that would lead to inequality, injustice and unfairness. 362. Retrospective operation of law in the field of election has been upheld by this Court (see Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand. (AIR 1970 SC 694). Retrospective operation of any law would cause hardship to some persons or other. This is inevitable; but that is no reason to deny to the legislature the power to enact retrospective law. In the case of a law which has retrospective effect, the theory is that the law was actually in operation in the past and if the provisions of the Acts are general in their operation, there can be no challenge to them on the ground of discrimination or unfairness merely because of their retrospective effect. In other words, if an Act cannot be challenged on the ground that its provisions are discriminatory or unreasonable if it is prospective in operation, those provisions cannot be attacked on these grounds merely because the provisions were given retrospective effect, unless there are special circumstances. I see no such special circumstances here. 363. I therefore hold that these Acts are not liable to be challenged on any of the grounds argued by counsel. 364. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the session of parliament in which the Election Laws amendment Act. 1975 and the 39th Amendment to the Constitution were passed was not properly convened and therefore the amendments were invalid. 365. The argument was that a number of members of the two houses of Parliament were illegally detained by executive orders before the summoning of the two Houses and that was made possible by the President — the authority to summon the two Houses — making an order under Article 359 of the Constitution on 27-6-1975, which precluded these members from moving the court and obtaining release from illegal detention and attending the session. In effect, the contention of counsel was that the authority to summon parliament effectually prevented by its order made under Article 359, those members who were illegally detained from attending the session and as the composition of the session was unconstitutional, any measure passed in the session would be bad. Reliance was placed by counsel upon the decision in A. Nambiar v. Chief Secretary, (1966) 2 SCR 406 = (AIR 1966 SC 657) in support of this proposition.