could be really no binding precedent in discretionary matters depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. The operation of the judgment of the trial Court and the consequential orders are staved only on "sufficient cause" shown on the facts of that case. In the case before us the sufficient cause seems to me to be apparent from a bare perusal of the judgment of the trial Court As I have pointed out below, the judgment under appeal contains glaringly erroneous conclusions reached by ignoring what has been repeatedly laid down in election cases by this Court even if one were to assume for the sake of argument that all the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court including some very questionable ones on which its conclusions rest were correct. 398. In a case where the bona fides of legislation and even of a Constitutional amendment, is questioned on the ground of a suggested frightfulness in the facts of the case which Parliament and the ratifying State Legislatures are to be supposed. If we are to accept the suggestion to have been acting in concert to prevent this Court from examining on merits it was. I think the duty of counsel making any such suggestion to invite our attention to any fact not fully disclosed or discussed in the judgment under appeal at least when he was asked as I repeatedly asked him in the course of this arguments extending over a period of about fifteen days out of a total period of hearing of the case for thirty two days how the trial Court's conclusions on the two matters, forming the subject-matter of appeal No. 887 of 1975 of the original respondent could possibly be justified. However, I have also satisfied myself by going through the whole evidence on record on these two matters which I shall presently deal with that learned counsel for the election petitioner could not possibly usefully add anything to the replies he actually gave on the questions put to him on these matters and to the discussion of the whole evidence on these question by the trial Court. I have taken pains to clarify this position as the learned counsel for the election petitioner at the end of arguments of both sides extending over thirty two days of actual hearing stated that he had argued on the assumption that we will be concerned only with the validity of the 39th Amendment and the validity and correct interpretation of the Acts of 1974 and 1975. I think that it was made clear to him that we will have to enter into the merits if that was necessary as I think it is for judging whether amendments in law where either necessary or justified learned counsel for the election petitioner was not prevented from dealing with any question whether of fact or law which he may have wanted to raise, Learned counsel for both sides had fully argued at least the election petitioner's appeal No. 909 of 1975 on facts and law. They had taken us sufficiently into facts and findings involved in the original respondent's appeal No. 887 of 1975 to justify our dealing with all questions necessary to decide this appeal on merits also. Indeed it is not necessary for us to go beyond findings of fact recorded by the learned Judge, as distinct from conclusion based upon them which are questions of law to demonstrate the very palpable errors committed by the learned Judge on the two questions which are the subject-matter of appeal No. 887 of 1975.