the light of the law laid down repeatedly by this Court in case of alleged corrupt practices. 411. The logical consequence of placing a charge of corrupt practice on the same footing as a criminal charge is obligation to interpret the words which define it strictly and narrowly. Indeed any natural and ordinary interpretation on the words "obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting" must carry with it the imperative requirement that the candidate concerned or his agent must have intentionally done an act which has the effect contemplated by Section 123 (7). In other words a "mens rea" or a guilty mind as well as an "actus reus" or a wrongful act must concur to produce the result contemplated by law. So far as election expenses are concerned it is possible to conceive that even an unintentional result (i.e. expenses "incurred" exceeding the prescribed limit) may be enough so that a duty to prevent this result may be there in law. But Section 123 (7) requires actual intended acts of "obtaining" or "procuring" or attempting or abetting. For Section 123 (7) results are immaterial. 412. In the case before us the petition contains, as I have indicated above the necessary averment of a deliberate direction by the original respondent herself so far as issue No. 1 is concerned and of "obtaining" and "procuring" as regards issue No.3. These are enough to denote the ingredients of a mens rea. But one will search the evidence in vain for any indication of a mens rea or guilty intent on the part of the original respondent or of her election agent when she had appointed one. As regards both issue 1 and 3 the learned Judge seemed to think that Sec 123 (7) creates what is called on "absolute statutory liability". Which does not required a mens rea. Although in dealing with issue No.2 he had himself after citing the necessary authorities taken the view that a mens rea was also essential. He had himself in dealing with issue No. 2 distinguished Dr. Y.S. Parmar v. Hira Singh AIR 1959 SC 244 a decision with whose ratio decided I have never, with due respect, felt happy in so far as it meant that a charge of corrupt practice under S. 123 (7) does not require proof of mens rea. It was decided on the strength of a statutory presumption. There were other decisions of the Supreme Court under earlier law showing that mere appointment of a Government servant as a polling agent could not be corrupt practice (See: Satya Dev v. Padam Dev 10 Ele LR 103 = (AIR 1954 SC 587). Mahendra Kumar v. Vidvavati 10 Ele LR 214 = (AIR 1956 SC 315) Dr. Parmar's case (supra) had necessitated an amendment in clause (2) of Explanation 1 of Section 123 (7) of the Act so that a Government servant, by merely acting as a polling agent could not be "deemed" to have so acted as to further the prospects of a candidate's election. The learned Judge had relied in his findings on issue No. 2 on Babu Bhai Vallabh Das Gandhi v. Pilloo Homi Mody, (1971) 36 Ele LR 108 at pp. 123-124 (Guj) and Haji Abdul Wahid v. B.V. Keskar, (1960) 21 Ele LR 409 at p. 432 (All.). But when he came to issue No. 3 and, right at the end of his judgment, to issue No. 1, he appears to have overlooked the basic requirements of a mens rea and an actus reus, or in any case, if he had these requirements in view, he erred in assuming that they existed here. I think he grevely erred in holding that some "actus reus"