power Mr. A.K. Sen, Learned Counsel for the original respondent, puts this very argument in the following words in his written submissions. ‘‘In the hands of the constituent authority there is no demarcation of powers. But the demarcation emerges only when it leaves the hands of the constituent authority through well-defined channels into demarcated pools. The constituent power is independent of the fetters or limitations imposed by separation of powers in the hands of the organs of the Government, amongst whom the supreme authority of the State is allocated. The constituent power is independent of the doctrine of separation of powers. Separation of powers is when the constitution is framed laying down the distribution of the powers in the different organs such as the legislative, executive and the judicial power. The constituent power springs as the fountain head and partakes of sovereignty and is the power which creates the organ and distributes the powers. Therefore, in a sense the constituent power is all embracing and is at once judicial, executive and legislative, or in a sense super power. The constituent power can also change the system of checks and balances upon which the separation of powers is based.’’ 522. The theory advanced before us may have been designed to escape the logical consequences of the majority view in Kesavananda Bharti’s case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra) which we cannot, sitting as a Bench of five Judges in this Court, overrule. The theory is, however, quite novel and has to be, I think, dealt with by us. It postulates an undifferentiated or amorphous amalgam of bare power constituting the ‘‘constituent power’’. According to this theory, the power which constitutes does not need to be either constituted or prevented from exercising a power assigned by it already to a constituted authority. Hence, it is a power of a kind which is above the Constitution itself. If I am not mistaken, the learned Solicitor-General did say that the constituent power lies ‘‘outside’’ the Constitution. In other words, it is independent and above the Constitution itself because it operates on the Constitution and can displace it with, so to say, one stroke of its exercise. I do not think that such an extreme theory could be supported by the citation of either the majority or minority views of Judges, baring stray remarks made in other contexts, either in the L.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab’s case (1967) 2 SCR 672 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643) or in the Kesavananda Bharti’s case (supra). In fact, in neither of these two cases was the question raised or considered at all by this Court whether the amending power or the ‘‘Constituent power’’ itself constituted such an amalgamated concentration of power, said to be distributed by the Constitution between the three different organs of a State at a ‘‘subsequent stage’’ whatever this may mean. The distribution of power of different kinds between the three organs was compared to delegation of authority to agents which could be withdrawn at any time by the constituent bodies. 523. If we were to accept the theory indicated above, it would make it unnecessary to have a constitution beyond one consisting of a single sentence laying down that every kind of power is vested in the constituent bodies