vital questions, resulting from differences in temperament, education, tradition, training interests and experiences in life, will often determine their honest choices between two or more reasonably possible interpretations of such words as ‘‘amendment’’ or ‘‘constituent power’’ in the Constitution. But, on certain clear matter of principle, underlying the Constitution, no reasonable person could entertain two views as to what was or could be really intended by the Constitution makers. One of these matters, clear beyond the region of all doubt, seems to me to be that the judicial and law making functions, however broadly conceived, could not possibly have been meant to be interchangeable. They are not incapable of distinction and differentiation, in any constitutionally prescribed sphere of operation of power including that of "constituent power". Each has its own advantages and disadvantages and its own natural modus operandi. 544. A lamentable example of what took place in the course of English constitutional history when a House of Commons, composed of very intelligent and learned people, one of whom, Holt, subsequently became a distinguished Chief Justice of England, took upon itself to sit in judgement on a decision of two Judges of the King's Bench Division, one of whom was suspected of being a partisan of Royal prerogative and power at a time when a struggle for supremacy between the competing legal claims of the King, as the titular sovereign, and those of the House of Commons, as representing the people, was still going on. In strict law which was unwritten, the position on that problem of power was not quite clear at that time. The episode is thus described by Lord Denman, C. J., in Stockadale v. Hansard, (1839) 112 ER 1112 (at p. 1163): "The next case to which I advert in truth embraced no question of privilege whatever, but, as one of the highest authorities in the States has thought otherwise, I shall offer some comments upon it, I mean Jay v. Topham, (112 How St. Tr. 821). The House of Commons ordered the defendant, their serjeant-at-arms, to arrest and imprison the plaintiff for having dared to exercise the common right off all Englishmen, of presenting a petition to the King on the state of public affairs, at a time when no Parliament existed. For this imprisonment an action was brought. The declaration complained, not only of the personal trespass, but also of extortion of the plaintiff's money practised by defendant under colour of the Speaker's warrant. The plea of justification under that warrant, which could not possibly authorise the extortion, even if it could the arrest, was overruled by this Court, no doubt with the utmost propriety, for the law was clear; Lord Ellenborough points this out in the most forcible manner, in 14 East 109. Yet for this righteous judgment C.J. Pemberton and one of his brethren were summoned before the Convention Parliament, when they vindicated their conduct by unanswerable reasoning, but were, notwithstanding, committed to the prison of Newgate for the remainder of the session. Our respect and gratitude to the Convention Parliament ought not to blind us to the fact that this sentence of imprisonment was as unjust and tyrannical as any of those acts of arbitrary power for which they deprived King James of his Crown. It