Parliament by reference to certain fundamental principles of natural justice and of common law (See Willis on Constitutional Law– Edn. 1936 p. 76). ‘‘This dictum of Coke, announced in Dr. Monham’s case (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 118-A was soon repudiated in England, but the doctrine accounced in Coke’s dictum found fertile soil in the United States and sprouted into such a vigorous growth that it was applied by the United States Supreme Court in the decision of cases coming before it, and it has been said that the doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme Court is the logical conclusion of Coke’s doctrine of control of the Courts over legislation.’’ 551. It seems to me that judicial review of all law making, whether it appertains to the sphere of fundamental law or of ordinary law, is traceable to this doctrine of judicial control by reference to certain basic principles, contained in a Constitution and considered too inviolable to be easily alterable. It may be that this doctrine is unsuitable for our country at a time when it is going through rapid socio-economic transformation. Nevertheless, so long as the doctrine is found embodied in our Constitution, we cannot refuse to recognise it. 552. In America, there was some doubt whether the doctrine of judicial review of al legislation naturally flowed out of the vesting of judicial power by Section 1 of Ariticle 3 of their Constitution which says: ‘‘The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.’’ (Willis on Constitutional Law– p. 1020). There is no article there, like Article 13 of our Constitution, which declared any kind of legislation abridging or taking away fundamental rights to be ‘‘void’’. The doubt was not without substance. It was removed by Chief Justice Marshall whose judgment in Marbury v. Madison, 1803 Cranch 137 firmly established the doctrine of judicial review and the supremacy of the Supreme Court of America, in the judicial field of interpretion, as the mouthpiece of the Constitution and therefore, of the ‘‘Real Will’’ of the people themselves. The Constitution, as the basic or fundamental law of the land, was to operate there as the touchstone of the validity of ordinary laws just as the validity of laws made by British colonial legislatures was tested by reference to the parential Act of the British Parliament. 553. Under our Constitution, by Article 141 of the Constitution, power is vested only in the Supreme Court and in no other organ or authority of the Republic to declare the law ‘‘which shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.’’ Article 143 of the Constitution of India also shows that whenever questions of fact or law have either arisen or are likely to arise, the President of India may, in view of their public importance seek the opinion of the Supreme Court, by a reference made to the Court. The procedure on such a reference is that of a judicial authority which hears those interested and then gives its opinion. Article 32 of the Constitution gives a wide power to the