itself directly, I do not see how clause (4) of Art. 329A, if it contained certain provisions on the assumption that such a judicial power was already there in Parliament, could be valid as a piece of mere law making. However, counsel supporting the 39th Amendment had submitted that Article 329A (4) evidenced and constituted an exercise of some "unbroken" or a combined legislative and judicial power — a proposition for which no precedent of any such consolidated action of a constituent body was cited from any part of the world. The Firmans of former Indian ruling princes were hardly suitable or applicable precedents. 585. An attempt was made to convince us that what may not have been otherwise possible for Parliament to do became possible by invoking presumed exercise of some judicial power imported by Art. 105 (3) of the Constitution which says: "105 (3) ..........the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution." 586. I am unable to see how what was not conferred upon Parliament itself in its constituent capacity could be impliedly assumed to be there by virtue of certain "powers privileges and immunities" which belong separately to each House of Parliament. Such a claim could not be based upon what is to be found directly in Art 368. It is sought to be derived from Art 105. This reasoning would obviously conflict with the provisions of Art 329 (b) of the Constitution which indicates that an election dispute can only be resolved by an election petition before a forum provided by an ordinary enactment. Article 329 (b) says: "329 (b) No election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature." 587. In exercise of its powers under Art 329 (b) our Parliament had enacted the Act of 1951. The procedure provided by the Act had the binding force of a constitutionally prescribed procedure. It could not be circumvented unless with reference to cases covered by Art 329 A (4) it had been first repealed. Only after such a repeal could any other forum or procedure be legally adopted. It could not be assumed by reason of Article 105(3) that the prescribed forum had shifted to Parliament itself and that Parliament in exercise of its constituent function had both legislated and adjudicated. This is what we were asked to accept. 588. The well recognised rule of construction of statutes, which must apply to the interpretation of the Constitution as well is; "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius”. From this is derived the subsidiary rule that an