Gounder. AIR 1971 SC 231; Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh, AIR 1974 SC 2068; Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly, AIR 1974 SC 396. 608. Cases were also cited of the exercise of Constitutional power of amendment by placing Acts in the 9th Schedule under the provisions of Article 31-B of the Constitution, such as Jagannath v. Authorised Officer. Land Reforms, (AIR) 1972 SC 425) (supra) so that Acts so included in the 9th Schedule were immune from attack on the ground of alleged violation of any fundamental rights. It is not necessary to cite them as this is now a well recognised constitutional device whose validity has been unheld by this Court in Kesavanand Bharti's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra). 609. Our attention was especially invited to passages from Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India AIR 1960 SC 1008 (supra) where it was said (at page 54); "In our opinion no useful purpose will be served by refering to the clear demarcation between the judicial powers and legislative powers in America and attempt to engraft the said principle in the working of our Constitution. This development of the law, as pointed out in A. K. Gopalan v. State 1950 SCR 88 at p. 198 = (AIR 1950 SC 27) was due to historical reasons." 610. After that the following passage from the judgment of Das, J in A.K. Gopalan's case AIR 1950 SC 27 was quoted (at page 55): “The Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in “due process of law.”... It is thus that the Supreme Court established its own supremacy over the executive and the Congress. In India the position of the Judiciary is some-where in between the Courts in England and the United States. While in the main leaving our Parliament and the State Legislatures supreme in their respective legislative fields, our Constitution has, by some of the articles, put upon the Legislature certain specified limitations.... Our Constitution, unlike the English Constitution, recognises the Court's supremacy over the legislative authority, but such supremacy is a very limited one, for it is confined to the field where the legislative power is circumscribed by limitations put upon it by the Constitution itself. Within this restricted field the Court may, on a scrutiny of the law made by the Legislature, declare it void if it is found to have transgressed the constitutional limitations.” 611. In Udai Ram Sharma's case (AIR 1960 SC 1008) (supra) the following passage from Willoughby's Constitution of the United States. Second Edition, Vol. 3. was also cited: “If the legislature would prescribe a different rule for the future from that which the Courts enforce, it must be done by statute, and cannot be done by a mandate to the Courts which leaves the law unchanged, but seeks to compel the Courts to construe and apply it not according to the judicial, but according to the legislative judment.... If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the Courts, by requiring of them a