construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by setting aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.” 612. Willoughby's statement of law in the United States of America showing that retroactive legislation which does not impair vested or substantial rights or constitutional prohibitions, is permissible and his conclusion, relying on Cooley's “Constitutional Limitations” was also quoted: “The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the judicial power is exerised by the Courts; and in doing so it may dispense with any of those formalities which are not essential to the jurisdiction of the Court; and whatever it may dispense with by statute anterior to the proceedings, we belive it may also dispensive with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the Court has failed to observe any of those formalities. But it would not be competent for the legislature to authorize a Court to proceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving them an opportunity to be heard before it and for the same reason it would be incompetent for it, by retrospective legislation, to make valid any proceedings which had been had in the Courts, but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties.” 613. In Udai Ram Sharma's case (AIR 1960 SC 1008) (supra) an argument, based on some observations in B.C. Ghose v. King Emperor, 1944 FCR 295 = (AIR 1944 FC 86) was that the provisions of an amending Act amounted to passing a decree. But, this Court repelled this argument relying on principles laid down in Q. v. Burah. (1878) 5 Ind App 178 (supra): “If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions.” 614. A case strongly relied upon by learned Counsel supporting the validity of Article 329-A (4) was; Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, 1970 (2) SCR 835 = (AIR 1970 SC 694). In this case decided by five Judges of this Court, there was unanimity on the conclusion that the State Legislature had power to retrospectively remove the disqualification of a candidate. The following quotation from the judgment (at page 851 of SCR) shows the reasoning adopted: “Mr. Chagla, larned Counsel for the respondent, contends that the Rajasthan State Legislature was not competent to declare retrospectively' under Art. 191 (1) (a) of the Constitution. It seems to us that there is no force in this contention. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that the State Legislatures and Parliament can legislate retrospectively subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Apart from the question of fundamental rights, no express restriction has been placed on the power of the Legislature