involved the usurpation and infringement by the legislature of the judicial powers inconsistent with the written constitution of Ceylon. Their Lordships, however, expressly referred on page 287 to the fact that the impugned legislation had not been passed by two-thirds majority in the manner required for an amendment of the Constitution contained in Section 29 (4) of the constitution. It was observed: “There was speculation during the argument as to what the position would be if Parliament sought to procure such a result by first amending the Constitution by a two-thirds majority. But such a situation does not arise here. In so far as any Act passed without recourse to Section 29(4) of the Constitution purports to usurp or infringe the judicial power it is ultra vires.” The above observations, it is urged, show that the restriction upon the legislature in encroaching upon judicial sphere may not necessarily hold good in the case of constituent authority. 194. The above contention has been controverted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan and he submits that the limitation on the power of the legislature that it cannot declare void a judgment of the court equally operates upon the constituent authority. It is urged that the constituent authority can only enact a law in general terms, even though it be a constitutional law. The constituent authority may also, if it so deems proper change the law which is the basis of a decision and make such change with retrospective effect, but it cannot, according to the learned counsel, declare void the judgment of the court. Declaration of voidness of a judgment, it is stated, is a judicial act and can not be taken over by the constituent authority. Although legislatures or the constituent authority can make laws including those for creation of courts, they cannot, according to the submission, exercise judicial functions by assuming the powers of a super court in the same way as the courts cannot act as a super legislature. It is in my opinion, not necessary to dilate upon this aspect and express a final opinion upon the rival contentions, because of the view I am taking of part (iii) of clause (4). 195. We may now come to part (iii) of clause (4) By part (iii) it is declared that the election of the appellant shall continue to be valid in all respects. Such a declaration would not follow from part (i) of the clause. It would not also follow from part (ii) and part (iv) of the clause which, as mentioned earlier, in effect represented the consequences flowing from part (i). The election to the Lok Sabha of the appellant, who was the Prime Minister, was challenged on the ground that she or her election agents had been guilty of some malpractices. The declaration that her election was to be valid in all respects necessarily involved the process of going into the grounds on which her election had been assailed and holding those grounds to be either factually incorrect or to be of such a nature as in law did not warrant the declaration of her election to be void. The case of the appellant is that some of the grounds mentioned against her were factually incorrect and in respect of those grounds the findings of the High Court is against the respondent and in her favour. In-respect of some other grounds, except in one or two matters there is not much divergence between the appellant and the respondent on