the words “returned candidate” in clause (b) of Section 100(1) must be taken to have been used with a view to identify the person who subsequently became a returned candidate. It is urged that if while dealing with corrupt practice committed by a candidate before he became a returned candidate in the context of Section 100(1) (b), it is permissible to hold that the words “returned candidate” are intended to identify the person who subsequently became a returned candidate, the same criterion should apply when construing the word “candidate” in Section 123 of the RP Act. This contention, in my opinion, is devoid of force. The definition of the words “returned candidate” and “candidate” given in Section 79 of the RP Act are preceded by the words “unless the context otherwise requires”. The connotation of the above words is that normally it is the definition given in the section which should be applied and given effect to. This normal rule may, however, be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied. So far as clause (b) of Section 100 (1) is concerned, the context plainly requires that the corrupt practice referred to in that clause should have been committed by the candidate before he became a returned candidate, or by his agent or by any other person with his consent or that of his election agent. The compulsion arising from the context which is there in clause (b) of Section 100(1) of the RP Act is singularly absent in Section 123(7) of the RP Act. There is nothing in the context of the latter provision which requires that we should not give full effect to the new definition of the word “candidate”. 220. Reference has also been made by Mr. Shanti Bhusan to observations on pages 222-3 of vol. 14 of Halsbury’s Laws of England Third Edition, according to which a candidate at a general election may be guilty of treating even though the treating took place before the dissolution of the Parliament and consequently before he came within the statutory definition of a candidate. These observations have been made in the context of the statutory provisions in the United Kingdom. Those provisions were couched in a language substantially different from that in which the provisions of the RP Act in India are couched and as such in my opinion, not much assistance can be derived from those observations. 221. As the appellant filed her nomination paper on February 1, 1971, in view of the amended definition of the word ‘‘candidate’’, it would have to be taken that the appellant became a candidate only on February 1, 1971. The result is that even if the finding of the High Court that the appellant obtained and procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur during the period from January 7 to 24, 1971 were assumed to be correct the appellant shall not be deemed to have committed corrupt practice under Section 123(7) of the RP Act. As regards the assistance of Yashpal Kapur which the appellant is alleged to have obtained and procured after January 14, 1971, the controversy stands resolved also by another amendment. According to the case of the appellant. Yashpal Kapur tendered his resignation by letter dated January 13, 1971 with effect from January 14, 1971. The High Court found that Yashpal Kapur continued to be in the service of the Government of India