As of the time of this publication no court has held that the Cheek/Ratzlaf standard applies to FECA offenses. In pre-Bryan and preCheek/Ratzlaf cases, the D.C. Circuit required a “knowing, conscious, and deliberate flaunting” of the statute, see Nat’l Right to Work Comm. v. FEC, 716 F.2d 1401, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1983); AFL-CIO v. FEC, 628 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1980); but, these cases do not reflect the evolved understanding of “willful” as articulated by the Supreme Court in Bryan, Cheek, and Ratzlaf. As the courts found in Whittemore and Danielczyk, the core prohibitions of FECA are not complex in the same manner as those regulatory schemes at issue in Cheek and Ratzlaf, and thus FECA does not merit the even higher intent standard. With the Bryan standard in mind, examples of evidence that has been used to prove that FECA violations were committed knowingly and willfully include: • The use of surreptitious means, such as cash, conduits, or false documentation, to conceal the violation; • Making a prohibited “in-kind” contribution by paying directly for goods or services provided to a recipient political committee; • Proof that the offender is active in political fundraising and is personally well-versed in the federal campaign financing laws (such as offenders who can be shown to be professional lobbyists or fundraisers); • Proof that the substantive FECA violation took place as part of another felonious end (such as the use of corporate funds to pay a bribe to a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201, with the bribe disguised as an ostensible campaign contribution to the official’s campaign committee); and 154