Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515441096 Page: 31 Date Filed: 06/04/2020 No. 20-50407 represent governmental speech, they are “not barred by the Free Speech Clause.” Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 207 (2015). The plaintiffs are not sui generis in their free speech protections. The preliminary injunction prohibiting General Paxton from “issuing any guidance, pronouncements, threats of criminal prosecution or orders” itself threatens his personal right to comment on matters of public concern. The Texas Attorney General enjoys no less robust a right to participate in the marketplace of ideas than does anyone else, including the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 133–35 (1966). IV. As to “whether the [stay] applicant[s] will be irreparably injured absent a stay,” Nken, 556 U.S. at 426, the state officials have easily met their burden. “When the State is seeking to stay a preliminary injunction, it’s generally enough to say [that] any time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.” Valentine, 956 F.3d at 803 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Texas legislature has articulated criteria for vote-by-mail eligibility, see TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 82.001–82.004, 82.007, which the Texas Supreme Court has held not to include a mere lack of immunity to the Virus, In re State, 2020 Tex. LEXIS 452, at *2. “The district court’s injunction prevents the State from effectuating the Legislature’s choice and hence imposes irreparable injury.” Valentine, 956 F.3d at 803. The subject and timing of the injunction render that injury particularly acute. [U]nder our Constitution[,] . . . the States are given the initial task of determining the qualifications of voters who will elect members 31

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