Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 53 Opinion of STEVENS, J. of corporate participation in candidate elections, the “im­ portance” of which “has never been doubted,” 435 U. S., at 788, n. 26, do not apply equally to regulations of corporate participation in referenda. A referendum cannot owe a political debt to a corporation, seek to curry favor with a corporation, or fear the corporation’s retaliation. Cf. Aus tin, 494 U. S., at 678 (STEVENS, J., concurring); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berke ley, 454 U. S. 290, 299 (1981). The majority likewise overlooks the fact that, over the past 30 years, our cases have repeatedly recognized the candidate/issue distinc­ tion. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U. S., at 659; NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 495–496; FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 371, n. 9 (1984); NRWC, 459 U. S., at 210, n. 7. The Court’s critique of Bellotti’s footnote 26 puts it in the strange position of trying to elevate Bellotti to canoni­ cal status, while simultaneously disparaging a critical piece of its analysis as unsupported and irreconcilable with Buckley. Bellotti, apparently, is both the font of all wisdom and internally incoherent. The Bellotti Court confronted a dramatically different factual situation from the one that confronts us in this case: a state statute that barred business corporations’ expenditures on some referenda but not others. Specifi­ cally, the statute barred a business corporation “from making contributions or expenditures ‘for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question sub­ mitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation,’ ” 435 U. S., at 768 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55, §8 (West Supp. 1977); alteration in original), and it went so far as to provide that referenda related to income taxa­ tion would not “ ‘be deemed materially to affect the prop­ erty, business or assets of the corporation,’ ” 435 U. S., at 768. As might be guessed, the legislature had enacted this statute in order to limit corporate speech on a proposed

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