Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
59
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
arise that affect these corporations and organizations.”
Id., at 623–624 (citations and footnote omitted).
Many of the relationships of dependency found by Judge
Kollar-Kotelly seemed to have a quid pro quo basis, but
other arrangements were more subtle. Her analysis
shows the great difficulty in delimiting the precise scope of
the quid pro quo category, as well as the adverse conse
quences that all such arrangements may have. There are
threats of corruption that are far more destructive to a
democratic society than the odd bribe. Yet the majority’s
understanding of corruption would leave lawmakers impo
tent to address all but the most discrete abuses.
Our “undue influence” cases have allowed the American
people to cast a wider net through legislative experiments
designed to ensure, to some minimal extent, “that office
holders will decide issues . . . on the merits or the desires
of their constituencies,” and not “according to the wishes of
those who have made large financial contributions”—or
expenditures—“valued by the officeholder.” McConnell,
540 U. S., at 153.63 When private interests are seen to
exert outsized control over officeholders solely on account
of the money spent on (or withheld from) their campaigns,
the result can depart so thoroughly “from what is pure or
——————
63 Cf.
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 389
(2000) (recognizing “the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors”). Though discrete in scope, these
experiments must impose some meaningful limits if they are to have a
chance at functioning effectively and preserving the public’s trust.
“Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influ
ence is manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes transactions, such
corruption is neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize.”
McConnell, 540 U. S., at 153. There should be nothing controversial
about the proposition that the influence being targeted is “undue.” In a
democracy, officeholders should not make public decisions with the aim
of placating a financial benefactor, except to the extent that the bene
factor is seen as representative of a larger constituency or its argu
ments are seen as especially persuasive.