90
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
rationale of those authorities, and after bypassing or
ignoring rules of judicial restraint used to cabin the
Court’s lawmaking power. Their conclusion that the
societal interest in avoiding corruption and the appear
ance of corruption does not provide an adequate justifica
tion for regulating corporate expenditures on candidate
elections relies on an incorrect description of that interest,
along with a failure to acknowledge the relevance of estab
lished facts and the considered judgments of state and
federal legislatures over many decades.
In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus on
the need to limit corporate campaign spending should
outweigh the wooden application of judge-made rules. The
majority’s rejection of this principle “elevate[s] corpora
tions to a level of deference which has not been seen at
least since the days when substantive due process was
regularly used to invalidate regulatory legislation thought
to unfairly impinge upon established economic interests.”
Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 817, n. 13 (White, J., dissenting). At
bottom, the Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the com
mon sense of the American people, who have recognized a
need to prevent corporations from undermining self
government since the founding, and who have fought
against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate
electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a
strange time to repudiate that common sense. While
American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority
of this Court would have thought its flaws included a
dearth of corporate money in politics.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents