22
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
or affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggre
gating over $200 have been made; persons to whom
loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total
sum of all contributions, operating expenses, out
standing debts and obligations, and the settlement
terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation.’ ”
540 U. S., at 331–332 (quoting MCFL, supra, at 253–
254).
PACs have to comply with these regulations just to
speak. This might explain why fewer than 2,000 of the
millions of corporations in this country have PACs.
See Brief for Seven Former Chairmen of FEC et al. as
Amici Curiae 11 (citing FEC, Summary of PAC Activity
1990–2006, online at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/
20071009pac/sumhistory.pdf); IRS, Statistics of Income:
2006, Corporation Income Tax Returns 2 (2009) (hereinaf
ter Statistics of Income) (5.8 million for-profit corporations
filed 2006 tax returns). PACs, furthermore, must exist
before they can speak. Given the onerous restrictions, a
corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to
make its views known regarding candidates and issues in
a current campaign.
Section 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent
expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As a “restriction on
the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign,” that statute
“necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restrict
ing the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Buck
ley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). Were the
Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could
repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the
various points in the speech process. See McConnell,
supra, at 251 (opinion of SCALIA, J.) (Government could
repress speech by “attacking all levels of the production