34 CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court antidistortion rationale. Austin sought to defend the antidistortion rationale as a means to prevent corpora tions from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ ” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the eco nomic marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 659 (quoting MCFL, supra, at 257). But Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an interest “in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.” 424 U. S., at 48; see Bellotti, supra, at 791, n. 30. Buckley was specific in stating that “the skyrocket ing cost of political campaigns” could not sustain the governmental prohibition. 424 U. S., at 26. The First Amendment’s protections do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Id., at 49. The Court reaffirmed these conclusions when it invali dated the BCRA provision that increased the cap on con tributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. See Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 16) (“Leveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election. The Constitution, however, confers upon voters, not Congress, the power to choose the Members of the House of Repre sentatives, Art. I, §2, and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws to influence the voters’ choices”). The rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity. Either as support for its antidistortion rationale or as a further argument, the Austin majority undertook to dis tinguish wealthy individuals from corporations on the ground that “[s]tate law grants corporations special ad